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ABSTRACT 
 
ZIAC, CATHERINE E. Enrollment Yield at Union College 2014. Department of  
Economics, March 2014.  
 
 ADVISOR: Tomas Dvorak 
 
 This study examines why some admitted students decide to enroll at Union 
College while others go elsewhere. I use data on nearly nine thousand first-time full-time 
regular decision applicants admitted to Union starting in the academic years beginning in 
the Fall 2009 through Fall 2013. 
There are significant differences between students who enroll at Union and those 
who enroll elsewhere. First, since Union's financial aid fully meets students’ financial 
needs, students with large financial need are much more likely to enroll at Union than 
students with smaller financial need or no financial need. For example, controlling for 
demographic and academic variables, students with financial need of 75 percent or more 
of Union's annual cost of attendance are more than twice as likely to enroll than students 
who do not require any financial aid. Second, since academically stronger students are 
likely to also have been admitted to other selective colleges, the students who enroll at 
Union have SAT scores that are about four percent lower than students who go 
elsewhere. Third, students who do not submit their SAT scores to Union are about seven 
percentage points more likely to enroll than those who do. This is true even after 
controlling for high school GPA.  
Fourth, privately-schooled students are less likely to enroll than publically-
schooled students and students from outside the North East and New York are less likely 
to enroll than students from New York. Again, these effects persist even after controlling 
for high school GPA. Fifth, since qualified minority students are likely to have other 
post-secondary educational options, controlling for financial need, black and Latino 
students are less likely to enroll than white students.  Finally, Union's program to attract 
highly qualified students (the Union Scholars Program) does not appear effective. 
Controlling for demographic and academic variables, students with a Union Scholars 
designation are no more likely to enroll than students without a Scholars designation. 
Overall, the results suggest that Union faces a competitive market for students where 
price (financial aid boosts enrollment) and perceived quality (stronger students enrolling 
at more selective schools) matter. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the enrollment trends of admitted students at Union College in 
Schenectady, NY. While Union currently has a predictive yield model in place, the goal 
of this study is to first better understand how yield varies with student demographics, 
academic quality, and financial need and second, to see where admitted students go 
instead of Union with respect to their individual academic quality. 
 
Enrollment yield is important to colleges for myriad reasons. First, it is a measure of a 
school’s quality or attractiveness to admitted students. The number says something about 
an admitted student’s preference for a given college. If a student prefers one college over 
all other options, he or she will choose to enroll. Second, the higher a school’s yield, the 
lower the number of applications needed to fill a school’s incoming class. Thirdly, to the 
extent that yield may vary across certain demographic, geographic, academic, or financial 
variables, enrollment yield information has implications for marketing strategies. Finally, 
better understanding the trends behind a university’s enrollment yield allows the 
institution to better tailor its admitted pool, thereby having some impact on its selectivity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DATA 
 
The first part of this study uses data from the Union College Admissions Office on first-
time full-time regular decision applicants admitted to the academic years starting in Fall 
2009 through Fall 2013. There are 8,901 observations (about 400 per year) with the 
annual admitted numbers provided in Table 3.1 of the Statistical Appendix.  
 
The variables available for most of these 8,901 observations include whether or not a 
student enrolled, demographic variables, geographic variables, academic quality 
variables, financial aid variables, and “other” variables such as “start term” variables and 
“major” variables. Descriptions for each of these variables are provided in Section 2 of 
the Statistical Appendix. The total number of observations for each of these variables by 
start term are available in Section 3 of the Statistical Appendix. 
 
Of the 8,901 regular decision undergraduate students admitted to Union College in 
Schenectady, NY in the last five years, 1,481 have chosen to enroll. This represents an 
enrollment yield on regular decision admissions of about 16.6% over the past five years. 
Figure 1 below shows the enrollment yield for each class year of students in our data. The 
red areas of the graph represent the students who were admitted but chose not to enroll, 
while the green areas represent those students who did decide to enroll at Union College. 
The area of each category in the graph is proportional to the number of students in that 
particular category. This type of chart will be used numerous times throughout this study. 
 
Figure 1 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
First we analyze yield across different categories without controlling for other variables. 
This allows us to better understand the basic, raw data.  
 
3.1 Demographics 
 
Figure 2 below shows the enrollment yields for each race/ethnic category in our data set. 
 
Figure 2
There appears to be few differences in enrollment yield across race with the exception of 
Black or African American students. These students yield at a rate of about 24.3% while 
all other students yield at a rate of 16.4%. This difference is statistically significant 
(Table 10.1).  
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Figure 3
 
As is apparent in Figure 3, males and females have yielded at essentially the same rate 
over the past five years. This can be verified statistically (Table 10.2).  
 
Figure 4
 
Those students who were home schooled for high school yield at the highest rate when 
looking at students by high school type, with a yield of 40.0%. However, these students 
do not appear in Figure 4 because there are only 15 observations. Our intuition is that 
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process this might cause them to be more likely to enroll.  These students are followed by 
charter school students at 19.0%, public at 17.9%, independent religious school students 
at 16.0%, and finally private school students at 13.5%.  
  
If we just compare students who attended public high schools to all other types of high 
schools, we see that the enrollment yield for public school students is 17.9% while the 
enrollment yield for all other students is 14.5%. This difference is statistically significant 
(Table 10.3).  
 
3.2 Geography 
 
Next we look at enrollment yield across the geographic variables in our data set. 
 
Figure 5
 
Figure 5 shows that the enrollment yield for international students is 18.9%, while the 
enrollment yield for domestic students is 16.3%. This difference is statistically significant 
(Table 10.4).  
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 Figure 6 
 
When we look at the enrollment yield by geographical region we see that the enrollment 
yield of students coming from New York State is the highest of any region at 18.7%, 
followed by the North East at 17.6%, outside of that United States1 at 16.4%, other 
territories within the United States at 12.6%, and finally the Mid-Atlantic at 11.9%.  
 
3.3. Academic quality of the student 
 
Figure 7 compares the distribution of Applicant Rating – Union’s composite measure of 
applicant’s academic quality – for those students who do not enroll versus those students 
who do. The histogram of scores for non-enrolled students is presented first in red, while 
the histogram of scores for the enrolled students is presented beneath in green. The two 
graphs share the same scale on the horizontal axis and have the mean score marked with a 
vertical dotted line. This makes it easier to compare the mean score of the non-enrolled 
cohort to the mean score of the enrolled cohort. This type of graph will be used elsewhere 
throughout the study. 
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  This discrepancy between the yield value for students coming from outside of the 
United States (16.4%) and the yield value for international students (18.9%) should not 
be alarming. Region refers to a student’s residency, while international status refers to a 
student’s citizenship. Union has many international students who have their residency 
listed as within the United States.  
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Figure 7 
 
 
Students who do not enroll have an average applicant rating about four points higher than 
students who do enroll (67.1 vs. 63.5). This difference appears to be meaningful and is 
statistically significant (Table 10.5).  
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 8 shows that, like applicant rating, the mean GPA for non-enrolled students is 
greater than the mean GPA for enrolled students. While the difference between a GPA of 
91.22 and 90.78 seems small, it is statistically significant (Table 10.6).  
 
Figure 9 
 
The high school rating is how Union views each admitted student’s high school on a 1 to 
5 scale where 1 is the lowest, worst possible rating and 5 is the highest, best possible 
rating. There are some high schools without a rating. As shown in Figure 8, as high 
school rating increases (improves), students yield at a lower rate.  
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Figure 10 
 
 
Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
 
 
Perhaps the most striking difference in academic quality between students who enroll and 
students who do not appears in students’ SAT scores. Figure 10 shows that the mean SAT 
score for non-enrolled students is about 3.3% higher than for students who do enroll 
(1338.1 vs. 1295.22). This difference is statistically significant (Table 10.7).   
 
The difference in SAT scores for enrolled students versus non-enrolled students is driven 
by differences in both components of the SAT composite score. Figure 11 shows that the 
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students is 3.2% (21.34 points) while Figure 12 shows that the difference between the 
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points). 
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Figure 13 
 
Like high school rating, a student’s schedule strength is Union’s assessment of the overall 
difficulty of an admitted student’s high school academic schedule. The exact 
methodology of this system is outlined in Table 2.4 of the Statistical Appendix. The 
lowest, worst possible value is 1 while the highest, best possible value is 11. Again, as 
schedule strength increases (improves), students yield at a lower rate. 
 
Figure 14 
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Union awards some of its top applicants admission to the Union Scholars program. 
Figure 14 shows that the enrollment yield for Scholars is 12.0% while the enrollment 
yield for non-scholars is 18.0%. This difference is statistically significant (Table 10.8) 
  
 Figure 15 
 
Union College is a standardized testing optional school, meaning students do not need to 
submit SAT or ACT scores to the college for admissions consideration. When we 
compare students who have their standardized test scores considered to students who ask 
to not have their test scores considered, we see that those student who do not have their 
test scores considered yield at a rate of 23.9%, while those students who do have their test 
scores considered yield at 14.6%. This difference is statistically significant (Table 10.9).  
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 Figure 16
 
Figure 16 shows that the enrollment yield for those students who share with Union that 
they do intend on applying for financial aid is nearly double of that for students who do 
not intend on applying for financial aid (20.7% vs. 10.6%).  This difference is statistically 
significant (Table 10.10).  
 
Figure 17 
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neediest students yield at the highest rate while those students who receive no financial 
aid and do not apply yield at the lowest rate. This trend generally holds as financial aid 
increases.  
 
On average, the financial need of non-enrolled students is about 21.3% of Union’s annual 
comprehensive fee while the financial need of enrolled students is 41.5%. This difference 
is statistically significant (Table 10.11). 
 
3.5 Other 
 
Figure 18 
 
As one might expect, the enrollment yield for students who visit Union on a campus visit 
is greater than that of students who do not visit. In fact, students who visit yield at a rate 
almost three times as great as that of students who do not visit (23.0% vs. 7.8%). This 
difference is statistically significant (Table 10.12).  
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Figure 19 
 
When completing FAFSA forms for financial aid during the college admissions process, 
students are given the option to list up to ten schools where they would like to have their 
FAFSA information sent. The form does not prompt students to rank their colleges in any 
particular order, but there is some evidence to suggest that students often list their top-
choice institution in position one, following by descending preferences. One might expect 
students who list Union in the number one position to yield at a higher rate than those 
students who list Union in the tenth position. Figure 19 shows this trend. Students who 
list Union in the first FAFSA position yield at an incredible 45.7%, with yield dropping 
almost perfectly as FAFSA position increases, and ending with those students who list 
Union in the tenth position yielding at just 9.4%.  
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Figure 20 
 
Figure 20 shows that legacy students yield at a rate almost twice as great as that of 
students who are not legacy students at Union College (34.9% vs. 15.3%). This 
difference is statistically significant (Table 10.13). 
  
Figure 21
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interest as “liberal arts” have yielded higher than all other majors at 20.4%. Potential 
engineering majors yielded the worst with a 15.1% enrollment yield. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis above examined enrollment yield by one characteristic at a time. In the 
Statistical Appendix we present results from multivariate regressions where we are able 
to examine the effects of each characteristic while controlling for others. 
 
4.1 Demographics & geography 
  
From our univariate analysis we understand that men and women yield at essentially the 
same rate (Figure 3). When we regress enrollment yield on gender and ethnicity dummy 
variables in a probit model, we find that males are about one percentage point less likely 
to enroll than females. This effect is statistically significant even after we control for 
other demographic variables, such as ethnicity, high school type, and region (Table 11.1). 
This effect continues to persist when we control for academic variables (Table 11.2). 
 
Black students are about four percentage points more likely to enroll than white students. 
This effect is statistically significant after we control for other demographic variables 
(Table 11.1), but disappears when we control for a student’s applicant rating (Table 
11.2). The effect is reversed when we control for financial aid (Table 11.8). This suggests 
that being black may just be a proxy for financial need. In fact, when we control for 
financial need black students are anywhere from five to twelve percentage points less 
likely to enroll than white students (Table 11.8). Our sense here is that these students 
might have many more options available to them when choosing a college due to 
affirmative action programs. Additionally, these students might be attracted elsewhere by 
differential packaging, a practice which Union does not take part in.  
 
Controlling for gender and ethnicity, home-schooled students are about 22 percentage 
points more likely to enroll than students who attended public high schools. Students who 
attended private high schools are about four percentage points less likely to enroll than 
students who attended public high schools (Table 11.1). When we control for a student’s 
applicant rating, the effect of being home-schooled goes up to 25.7%, while students that 
attended a religious independent high school are now 2.9 percentage points less likely to 
enroll than students who attended public high schools and the effect of attending a private 
high school now drops to -5.8% relative to those students who attended public high 
schools. We see similar effects when controlling for a student’s GPA and SAT score 
(Table 11.2). 
 
After controlling for other demographic variables, students from the Mid-Atlantic and 
students coming from a region outside of New York and the North Eastern states, but still 
inside the Unite States are both about five percentage points less likely to enroll than 
students coming from New York State (Table 11.1). 
 
4.2 Academic quality of the student 
 
	   19	  
When we control for a student’s demographics, we see that for every additional point in 
one’s applicant rating that student is less likely to enroll by a little less than a half of a 
percentage point. Albeit small, this effect is statistically significant. Similarly, when we 
control for gender and ethnicity we see that a one point increase in GPA makes a student 
about a half of a percentage point less likely to enroll than a student with a lower GPA. 
This effect is also statistically significant (Table 11.3). Similarly, after controlling for 
demographics, a student with a higher SAT score is on average less likely to enroll. A ten 
point increase in SAT scores leads to a one percentage point decrease in probability of 
enrolling. This effect is statistically significant (Table 11.3).  
 
Students who do not have their standardized test scores considered throughout Union’s 
application process are about eight percentage points more likely to enroll than students 
who do. Are these students simply of a poorer academic quality, which we know from 
our univariate analysis generally means that they will yield at a higher rate, seeing as 
overall non-enrolled students have stronger academic credentials? Even after we control 
for a student’s academic quality using applicant rating we find that students who do not 
have their test scores considered are still about six percentage points more likely to enroll 
than students who do. Controlling for one’s GPA makes such a student 7.8% more likely 
to enroll (Table 11.4). This supports remaining SAT-optional in order to help enrollment 
yield. 
 
4.3 Union Scholars Program 
 
Union offers some of its applicants of top academic quality admission to its Union 
Scholars program. Because these program designations are awarded based on academic 
performance, we might expect these students to yield at a lower rate on average, knowing 
that in general students of a higher academic quality tend to yield at a lower rate than 
those students of a lesser academic quality. At the same time, aside from rewarding some 
of Union’s top students for their past academic excellence during their time at Union, the 
program is in part designed to attract students of high academic quality that would 
otherwise enroll at other institutions. 
 
In our univariate analysis we saw that students with a Scholars designation yield at  
a rate of about six percentage points less than students without a Scholars designation 
(Figure 14). In Table 11.5 we ask if a Scholars designation has an effect while controlling 
for academic quality. In none of our specifications does Scholars designation increase the 
probability of enrollment. When we regress enrollment yield on a Scholar status dummy 
while controlling for demographic variables and students’ GPAs, we find that students 
with a Scholars designation are about 4.7 percentage points less likely to enroll than 
students without a Scholars designation. The effect is statistically insignificant 
controlling for applicant rating and SAT scores (Table 11.5). 
 
We can surmise that those students admitted to the Union Scholars program are probably 
extended similar offers by other schools. Perhaps students admitted to the Union Scholars 
program simply find it less attractive than related programs at other institutions. Many 
schools refer to these types of programs as “Honors” programs, some even admit students 
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into the school’s “Honors College” as a way to attract bright students. Many of these 
programs include special housing where the members of the honors program can learn 
and live together. Union does not extend such an offer. Holding a student’s academic 
quality constant, having a Scholars designation probably represents the extension of 
similar offers from other schools, which admitted students ultimately must find more 
attractive than Union’s program. 
 
4.4 Financial aid 
 
Financial aid has a strong effect on the enrollment decision of Union’s admitted students. 
We saw that as an applicant’s financial aid increased, the enrollment yield also increased 
(Figure 17). The first component of the financial aid process at Union is intent – did the 
applicant tell the college that he or she intended to apply for financial aid? Apparently, a 
student who simply lets Union know that he or she intends on applying for financial aid is 
about 8.5 percentage points more likely to enroll than a student who does not intend on 
applying for financial aid. Controlling for a student’s applicant rating or GPA increases 
the effect of aid intent to approximately ten percentage points more likely, while 
controlling for SAT scores keeps the effect at about 8.6 percentage points (Table 11.6). 
Clearly, Union’s policy of meeting financial need is attractive to students with financial 
need. 
 
When we regress enrollment yield on financial aid brackets and control for demographic 
variables, we find that every bracket except for the <25% category is more likely to enroll 
than those admitted students who do not receive any financial aid and did not apply. The 
significance of these effects persists even after we control for a student’s academic 
quality. In fact, now even the <25% category is statistically significantly more likely to 
enroll than those students who do not receive any financial aid and did not apply. The 
magnitude of the effect is large. Students with need greater than 25% of Union’s annual 
comprehensive fee are more likely to enroll by 5.8 to 25.5 percentage points (Table 11.7).  
 
4.5 Other 
 
Those applicants who have visited the Union campus yield a much higher rate than those 
applicants who have not (Figure 18). When regressed with demographic variables and 
controlling for geography, a student who visits the Union College campus is about fifteen 
percentage points more likely to enroll than a student who does not. Even after 
controlling for a student’s academic quality this significance persists (Table 11.8). While 
these results are positive for Union’s enrollment yield, we also understand that visiting 
campus has a certain “chicken-or-the-egg” quality to it; do students visit campus because 
they already know that they are going to enroll, or does the visit persuade them? It is 
difficult to tell.  
  
We know from our univariate analysis that being a legacy applicant has very positive 
implications for enrollment, with the yield more than doubling for legacy students versus 
non-legacy students (Figure 20). When regressed with demographic variables, a student 
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who is a legacy student is about eighteen percentage points more likely to enroll than a 
student who is not. Controlling for academic quality yields the same effect (Table 11.9).  
 
Applicants who have identified themselves as generic Liberal Arts majors yield at a 
higher rate than those students who have given Union a more specific major (Figure 21). 
When we control for a student’s demographics we find that students who have specified a 
particular major are between two to four percentage points less likely to enroll than a 
student with a Liberal Arts designation. When we control for academic quality this effect 
persists (Table 11.10). One gets the sense that Union does better with students who are 
exploring their interests rather than students who really know what they want in terms of 
an academic major. These students might seek out specific programs not offered by a 
Liberal Arts college like Union. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ANALYZING THE ACTIONS OF NON-ENROLLEES 
 
Next we analyze the actions of non-enrollees. To take a closer look at the characteristics 
of the schools attended by Union’s non-enrollees we use data from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System. We use two measures of school quality: average 
SAT score and admissions selectivity. These quality measures are taken from the year 
2012 and merged with the Union College Admissions Data by school identification 
number.  
 
5.1 Characteristics of schools attended by non-enrollees 
 
SAT_mid is defined as the average SAT score of the enrolled students at a college. 
Higher values are more desirable. Selectivity is defined as the percent of applied students 
who are actually admitted by a college. Because this method would make lower values 
for selectivity mean that a college is relatively more selective, we invert this number so 
that higher values of selectivity represent a more selective school. In other words, 
selectivity is now the rejection rate (the higher the rejection rate, the higher the 
selectivity). The descriptive statistics for these variables are given in Section 9 of the 
Statistical Appendix.  
 
Of the colleges attended instead of Union College by students admitted to Union, 
Virginia State University has the lowest average SAT score (of the colleges that report 
SAT data) and the California Institute of Technology has the highest average SAT score. 
Harvard University is the most selective college attended by Union admitted students 
instead of Union while the University of Wisconsin Colleges are the least selective.  
 
In the IPEDS data, it is important to note that Union’s selectivity is listed as 38.2% 
(which we invert to 61.8%). Union’s selectivity means that it only admits 38.2% of the 
students who apply to the college. Union does not have an average SAT score listed in 
the IPEDS data because it does not require students to provide their SAT scores for the 
admissions process, but we know from the Admissions Department that this value is 
1310.  
 
5.2 Distribution of non-enrollees versus school quality measures 
 
Now we look at how student enrollment varies across different measures of school 
quality. Of our approximately 7000 non-enrollees, we know where those students 
attended instead of Union for about 4000 of them.  
 
First we see how many students attend schools with average SAT scores greater than, 
equal to, or less than Union’s average value of 1310. We see that approximately 44% of 
admitted students for whom we know their destination school (and that school reports its 
average SAT score) attend schools with a higher average SAT score than Union. 54% 
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attend schools with a lower average SAT score and 2% attend schools with the same 
average SAT score. This information is presented in Panel A of Table 1 below. 
 
 Table 1 
Distribution of Non-enrollees across School Average SAT Brackets 
Panel A: Distribution Relative to Union College 
SAT Scores Frequency Percent 
SAT above 1310 1560 43.56 
SAT equal to 1310 82 2.29 
SAT below 1310 1939 54.15 
Total 3581 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution Across Even Brackets 
SAT above 1380 680 17.00 
SAT btwn 1380 & 1340 543 13.55 
SAT btwn 1340 & 1290 545 13.63 
SAT btwn 1290 & 1200 720 17.97 
SAT below 1200 705 17.67 
Schools not reporting SAT 808 20.17 
Total 4,006 100.00 
 
Next we want to better understand how far away students go from Union’s mean. Are 
those students who attend schools with lower average SAT scores than Union going to 
schools with an average SAT score of 1300 (just 10 points below Union) or schools with 
an average SAT score of 1200 (100 points below Union)? We go through the following 
procedure:  
 
First we find that about 20% of students for whom we know their destination school 
attend colleges that do not report average SAT scores. Next we take the remaining cohort 
of non-enrollees that we know destination schools for and divide them into quintiles to 
see what their schools look like in terms of mean SAT scores. Approximately one fifth of 
these non-enrollees attend schools with an average SAT score above 1380, one fifth 
attend schools with an average SAT score between 1380 and 1340, one fifth attend 
schools with an average SAT score between 1340 and 1290, one fifth attend schools with 
an average SAT score between 1290 and 1200, and one fifth attend schools with an 
average SAT score less than 1200. These brackets are listed in Panel B of Table 1 above.  
 
We also look at how enrollment varies across school selectivity. We again first see how 
many students attend schools that are more selective than or less selective than Union. 
Because school selectivity values are extremely granular, no school in our data set has the 
same selectivity value as Union (approximately 62%). Therefore, we can divide schools 
into just two groups based on selectivity: those that are more selective than Union and 
those that are less selective than Union. We find that approximately 47% of non-enrollees 
attend schools that are more selective than Union and 53% of non-enrollees attend 
schools that are less selective. These values are presented in Panel A of Table 2 below.  
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 Table 2  
Distribution of Non-enrollees across School Selectivity Brackets 
Panel A: Distribution Relative to Union College 
Selectivity Frequency Percent 
Selectivity above 62% 2009 47.35 
Selectivity below 62% 2234 52.65 
Total 4,243 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution Across Even Brackets 
Selectivity above 70% 680 17.00 
Selectivity btwn 70% & 65% 543 13.55 
Selectivity bwtn 65% & 55% 545 13.63 
Selectivity btwn 55% & 40% 720 17.97 
Selectivity below 40% 705 17.67 
Total 4,006 100.00 
 
As we did earlier with the schools’ average SAT scores, we now divide our non-enrollees 
that we know destination schools for into quintiles to see what their schools look like in 
terms of selectivity. Approximately one fifth of these non-enrollees attend schools with 
selectivity greater than 70%, one fifth attend schools with selectivity between 70% and 
65%, one fifth attend schools with selectivity between 65% and 55%, one fifth attend 
schools with selectivity between 55% and 40%, and one fifth attend schools with 
selectivity less than 40%. These brackets are listed in Panel B of Table 2 above. 
 
5.3 Do student quality measures match school quality measures? 
 
We understand from Section 5.2 how different measures of school quality vary across 
enrollment, but do higher quality students choose to attend higher quality schools in a 
significant way? What kinds of applicants does Union lose to schools of various quality? 
We now take a closer look at the make-up of the students in each bracket of a given 
school quality. Across each bracket of school average SAT scores we see how students 
are distributed according to their own SAT scores. Across each bracket of school 
selectivity we see how students are distributed according to their applicant rating. We use 
bar charts like Figures 22 and 23 below to do this. The other combinations (student 
applicant rating across school average SAT score brackets and student SAT scores across 
school selectivity brackets) are not included here because they tell essentially the same 
story as the figures provided.  
 
Students are divided into “top,” “middle,” and “bottom” based on their quality measure. 
For student SAT scores we take all of the students for whom we have SAT scores and 
divide them into three equal groups based on their SAT scores. We find that students in 
the top cohort have SAT scores greater than or equal to 1380, students in the middle 
cohort have SAT scores between or equal to 1280 and 1370, and students in the bottom 
cohort have SAT scores less than or equal to 1270. Bottom students are represented by 
the blue portion of each bar, while middle students are represented by the red portion of 
each bar, and top students are represented by the green portion of each bar.  
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Figure 22 below shows the bar chart describing the make-up of the students in terms of 
their own SAT scores in each bracket of school average SAT scores. We see that for the 
top bracket of school average SAT scores, many more students with the “top” SAT 
scores attend than students with the “bottom” SAT scores. Moving down the chart, for 
schools with average SAT scores between 1290 and 1340 the distribution of applicants is 
much more even; approximately the same number of students with the “top” SAT scores 
attend as students with the “middle” or “bottom” SAT scores. In the lowest bracket of 
school average SAT scores, those schools with average SAT scores less than 1200, many 
more students with the “bottom” SAT scores attend than students with the “top” SAT 
scores. This figure corroborates the hypothesis that higher quality students choose to 
attend higher quality schools.  
 
 Figure 22 
  
 
Next we examine student applicant rating across school selectivity brackets. This time we 
divide all the students for whom we have applicant rating values into three equal groups 
based on their applicant ratings. We find that students in the top cohort have applicant 
rating values greater than or equal to 74, students in the middle cohort have applicant 
rating values between or equal to 63 and 73, and students in the bottom cohort have 
applicant rating values less than or equal to 62. Once again, bottom students are 
represented by the blue portion of each bar, while middle students are represented by the 
red portion of each bar, and top students are represented by the green portion of each bar. 
 
Figure 23 below shows the bar chart describing the make-up of the students in terms of 
their applicant rating values in each bracket of school selectivity. Like Figure 22, we see 
that for the top bracket of school selectivity, many more students with the “top” applicant 
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rating values attend than students with the “bottom” applicant rating values. In all of the 
other brackets of selectivity the distribution seems to be pretty even; approximately the 
same number of students with the “top” applicant rating values attend as students with the 
“middle” or “bottom” applicant rating values. Perhaps only in the lowest two brackets of 
school selectivity do we see more students with the “bottom” applicant rating values than 
other students. 
 
 Figure 23 
 
 
5.4 Multivariate analysis of schools attended instead of Union 
 
Like our multivariate analysis of students’ enrollment decisions in Section 4, we now turn 
to multivariate analysis of the schools attended instead of Union by regressing schools’ 
mean SAT scores and selectivity on student demographic and academic variables.  
 
Looking at schools’ mean SAT scores, when we control for gender and ethnicity, a one 
point increase in applicant rating means that a student will enroll at a school with a mean 
SAT score about 2.8 points higher on average. This positive correlation is corroborated 
by the top bracket of schools’ SAT scores in Figure 22 above. A one point increase in a 
student’s GPA means that he or she will choose to enroll at a school with a mean SAT 
score about 4.2 points higher on average. Finally, a ten-point increase in a student’s SAT 
score means that he or she will enroll at a school with a mean SAT score 4.0 points 
higher on average (Table 11.11). All of these effects are statistically significant. 
 
Controlling for gender and ethnicity, we see that a one point increase in a student’s 
applicant rating means that he or she will choose to enroll at a school about 0.4% more 
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selective, while a one point increase in a student’s GPA means that he or she will choose 
to enroll at a school about 0.6% more selective. A ten-point increase in a student’s SAT 
score means that he or she will choose to enroll at a school about 0.6% more selective 
(Table 11.12). Again, all of these effects are statistically significant. 
 
	   28	  
CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the past five years Union has “done best” with white, public-schooled, financially 
needy females of lower academic quality and an undeclared major upon applying to 
Union as regular decision. Union loses students of high academic quality to high quality 
schools and programs like the Union Scholars program do little to counteract this.  
 
Just as Union admits more students than it could ever accommodate in any given year in 
order to secure a complete class, students apply to many different colleges in order to 
make sure that they are accepted into some college that best meets their needs. Students 
of higher academic quality often have more choices because they meet the academic 
standards of the most selective institutions while also easily meeting the standards of less 
selective colleges. Many of the less selective colleges will admit students of extremely 
high academic standing even though they know that these students may be drawn to more 
selective colleges. Presented with so many choices, students of high academic quality 
often, though not always, choose to enroll at the most selective colleges.  
 
That being said, the market for post-secondary education is a fairly competitive market 
and individual institutions must compete with one another on price and on quality. 
Caroline Hoxby, a notable academic in the field of education management, has noted that 
since the 1960s, students and their families began viewing a college education as a type 
of commodity. Thus, the market for post-secondary education must be approached like 
any other market. We see that Union does well with attracting enrollees through its 
financial aid packages, but there are myriad factors that determine where an individual 
student chooses to enroll and the data show that the students of highest academic quality 
do not necessarily sort themselves to the schools of highest quality. There is much more 
“mixing” than one might expect, suggesting that schools can not be complacent in the 
recruiting and admissions process, but must be well-managed to survive.  
 
For the students for whom we have information about their destination schools, about 
53% of those non-enrollees choose to attend schools that are less selective than Union. 
This number does not change much when look at it on a year-to-year basis. What makes a 
student go to a “lower quality” school when they have been admitted to a “higher 
quality” school? Clearly there are other factors that are influencing their decision making 
process when it comes to going to a certain college.  
 
While Union routinely monitors its enrollment yield, a closer examination of the mix of 
students that decide to enroll could offer clues on how Union is perceived. Future work 
should focus on developing a measure of Union’s ability to attract high quality students. 
As a first step we examine the comparative academic quality of enrolled students versus 
non-enrolled student over the past five years. While our median applicant rating and SAT 
score of our enrolled student body has always been lower than that of the non-enrollees 
for the past five years, there is little change in either measure of student academic quality 
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over the past five years. This is displayed visually in Figures 24 and 25 below, which 
show the median values for non-enrollees (N) versus enrollees (Y).  
 
 Figure 24 
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 Figure 25  
 
 
The most effective tool in Union’s admissions toolbox seems to be financial aid; the 
needier the student, the more likely he or she is to enroll. Nevertheless, financial aid is a 
finite resource. Could there be a better way to structure or distribute the fixed pool of 
financial aid money that Union may give out each year in order to attract certain 
students? Future work could answer that question.  
 
The discussion of financial aid calls to mind the changing effects that ethnicity had on the 
likelihood of enrolling at Union. We recall that when controlling for demographic 
variables, black students were about four percentage points more likely to enroll than 
white students. But after controlling for financial need, black students were five to twelve 
percentage points less likely to enroll than white students. A study presented at the 2009 
National Association for College Admission Counseling found that African-American 
students were more likely to have chosen a school for the “scholarship/financial 
assistance” it offered. Many schools practice differential packaging in order to combat 
the difficulties of achieving diversity, but Union does not.  
 
Finally, our beautiful campus and family loyalties seem to speak for themselves; students 
who have visited Union yield at a much higher rate and legacy students are much more 
likely to enroll. In a spring 2013 poll conducted by Noel-Levitz, college admissions 
officials at four-year private institutions rated campus visit days as the second most 
effective practice for marketing and student recruitment. That being said, students who 
make the effort to visit campus during the admissions process may already be more 
inclined to enroll.  
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In terms of other existing literature, unlike a study by Goenner and Pauls (2006), we 
found that applicants who expressed interest in a particular major were less likely to 
enroll. Tim Copeland of the blog, “Higher Education Marketing and Enrollment 
Management,” suggests that schools tailor their marketing approaches to each individual 
student instead of a mass-marketing tactic and the results of our study certainly supports 
this.  
 
This study showed that there are a number of strong predictors of enrollment at Union 
College. Union already has a predictive model in place that says if the school admits so 
many applicants, so many will enroll. This study explains what type of students are 
enrolling and calls for Union to tailor its marketing practices and financial aid packages 
in order to drive certain types of students to enroll. Future work should focus on 
developing a predictive model that explains how adjusting certain practices throughout 
the admissions process will better attract certain types of students to Union. 
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Enrollment Yield Study Statistical Appendix 
 
Union College 
March 2014 
 
Prepared by  
Catherine Ziac 
 
 This is an appendix to an Enrollment Yield at Union 2014 report. It contains 
detailed information regarding enrollment trends at Union for full-time first-time regular 
decision applicants for the academic years starting Fall 2009 through Fall 2013 as well as 
a brief summary of existing literature on enrollment management at the collegiate level. 
The appendix is organized as follows: In the first part, we look at the Union College 
admissions variables by start term. In the second part we use multivariate analysis and 
examine how the likelihood of enrolling at Union varies with some characteristics while 
controlling for others. Finally, we examine existing literature on the subject. 
 
1. About the data 
 
This data was last updated by the Union College Admissions Office on 2/11/2014.  
 
2. Definition of terms 
- ACT – American College Testing 
- Admitted Student – Student accepted to Union College through the regular decision 
admissions process 
- Enrolled Student – Student who decides to enroll as a full time first year undergraduate 
at Union College through the regular decision process 
- FAFSA – Free Application for Federal Student Aid prepared annually by current and 
prospective college students in the United States to determine their eligibility for student 
financial aid 
- GPA – Grade point average 
- SAT – Scholastic Assessment Test 
 
2.1 Key dependent variables 
admitted_dummy =1 if student was admitted through the regular decision application 
process 
enrolled_dummy =1 if student chose to enroll in the fall term of his or her freshman year 
 
2.2 Demographic variables 
alien_dummy =1 if student Non Resident Alien 
asian_dummy =1 if student Asian 
black_dummy =1 if student Black or African American 
charter_dummy =1 if student attended a charter high school 
ethnicity 
 = “American Indian or Alaska Native” 
 = “Asian” 
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 = “Black or African American” 
 = “Hispanic/Latino” 
 = “Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Island” 
 = “Non Resident Alien” 
 = “Race/Ethnicity Unknown” 
 = “Two or more Races” 
 = “White” 
gender 
 = “F” student female 
 = “M” student male 
home_dummy =1 if student was homeschooled for high school 
hstype 
 = “C” charter high school 
 = “H” home school high school 
 = “I” independent religious high school 
 = “N”  
 = “P” public high school 
 = “R” private high school 
latino_dummy -1 if student Hispanic/Latino 
male_dummy =1 if student male 
other_dummy =1 if student American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Island, Two or more Races 
private_dummy =1 if student attended a private high school 
public_dummy =1 if student attended a public high school 
relig_dummy =1 if student attended an independent religious high school 
unknown_dummy = 1 if student unknown ethnicity 
white_dummy = 1 if student White 
 
2.3 Geographic variables 
internationalstatus 
 = “Not International” student not an international student 
 = “International” student international student 
internationalstatus_dummy =1 if student international student 
region 
 = “NY” student from New York State 
 = “Mid-Atlantic” student from Pennsylvania or New Jersey 
 = “North East” student from Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont 
 = “Other” student from any other American state or territory 
 = ”Outside US” student not from US state or territory 
region_ma_dummy = 1 if student from Pennsylvania or New Jersey 
region_ne_dummy = 1 if student from Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont 
region_other_dummy = 1 if student from any other American state or territory 
region_out_dummy = 1 if student not from US state or territory 
state 
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2.4 Academic quality of the student 
applicantrating  - rating system 
gpa – high school grade point average 
hsrating – how Union views the high school (higher numbers are better) 
sat – combined SAT math and verbal score 
satmath – SAT math score 
satverbal – SAT verbal score 
schedulestrength 
 =2 no advanced classes 
 =4 some honors or advanced; no top 
 =6 1 top class 
 =8 2-3 top classes 
 =10 4+ top classes 
 -1 if not carrying five majors (math, science, foreign language, social studies, 
English) senior year 
 +1 if in double curriculum 
scholarstatus 
 = “N” student not admitted to Union Scholar program 
 = “Y” student admitted to Union Scholar program 
scholarstatus_dummy =1 if student admired to some scholar program 
testingnotconsidered_dummy =1 if student asked to have his or her test scores not 
considered in the admissions process 
 
2.5 Financial variables 
financialaidintent  
 = “N” student did not apply for financial aid 
= “Y” student applied for financial aid 
financialaidintent_dummy =1 if student responded yes to financial aid intent 
finneed_0_a_dummy =1 if student received no financial aid, but applied 
finneed_0_25_dummy = 1 if student received <25% financial aid as a percentage of the 
annual cost of attendance 
finneed_25_50_dummy = 1 if student received 25-50% financial aid as a percentage of 
the annual cost of attendance 
finneed_50_75_dummy = 1 if student received 50-75% financial aid as a percentage of 
the annual cost of attendance 
finneed_75_dummy = 1 if student received >75% financial aid as a percentage of the 
annual cost of attendance 
instneed – financial aid need (institutional methodology rather than federal) 
 blank if received some aid (Stafford Loans, merit scholarships) without 
submitting a CSS profile 
need_pct – financial aid need as a percentage of Union’s annual cost of attendance  
u_finneed  
 = “No Financial Need, Not Applied” if student received no financial need and did 
not apply 
 = “No Financial Need, Applied” if student received no financial aid, but applied 
	   35	  
 
 = “Financial Need: >0-25%” if student received <25% financial aid as a 
percentage of the annual cost of attendance 
 = “Financial Need: 25-50%” if student received 25-50% financial aid as a 
percentage of the annual cost of attendance 
 = Financial Need: 50-75%” if student received 50-75% financial aid as a 
percentage of the annual cost of attendance 
 = Financial Need: >75%” if student received >75% financial aid as a percentage 
of the annual cost of attendance 
 
2.6 Other 
campusvisit 
 = “N” student did not visit campus during application process 
 = “Y” student did visit campus during application process 
campusvisit_dummy = 1 if student did visit campus during application process 
startterm 
 = “09/FA” fall 2009 
 = “10/FA” fall 2010 
 = “11/FA” fall 2011 
 = “12/FA” fall 2012 
 = “13/FA” fall 2013 
legacystatus  
 = “N” student not an alumni child/grandchild/sibling 
 = “Y” student an alumni child/grandchild/sibling 
legacystatus_dummy = 1 if student is an alumni child/grandchild/sibling 
major 
 = “engineering” if student engineering major 
 = “humanities” if student humanities major 
 = “liberal arts” if student liberal arts major 
 = “science” if student science major 
 = “social science” if student social science major 
majorengineering_dummy =1 if student engineering major 
majorhumanities_dummy =1 if student humanities major 
majorscience_dummy =1 if student science major 
majorsocialscience_dummy =1 if student social science major 
sat_mid – average SAT score for the college 
selectivity – inverse of percent students admitted of applied students 
union_fafsa_position 
 =0 Union not listed on FAFSA form 
 =1 Union listed in first position on FAFSA form 
 =2 Union listed in second position on FAFSA form 
 =3 Union listed in third position on FAFSA form 
 =4 Union listed in fourth position on FAFSA form 
 =5 Union listed in fifth position on FAFSA form 
 =6 Union listed in sixth position on FAFSA form 
 =7 Union listed in seventh position on FAFSA form 
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 =8 Union listed in eighth position on FAFSA form 
 =9 Union listed in ninth position on FAFSA form 
 =10 Union listed in tenth position on FAFSA form 
yield – percent students enrolled of admitted students  	  
3. Union College enrollment rates 
	  
3.1 Admitted statistics 
----------------- 
          |Admitt 
Start     |  ed   
Term      |     Y 
----------+------ 
    09/FA | 1,680 
    10/FA | 1,739 
    11/FA | 1,865 
    12/FA | 1,796 
    13/FA | 1,821 
----------------- 	  
3.2 Enrollment statistics 
------------------------ 
          |enrolled_dumm 
Start     |      y       
Term      |     0      1 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA | 1,401    279 
    10/FA | 1,463    276 
    11/FA | 1,554    311 
    12/FA | 1,476    320 
    13/FA | 1,526    295 
------------------------ 
	  
3.3 Enrollment rates 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(enroll~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .1660714 
    10/FA |       .1587119 
    11/FA |        .166756 
    12/FA |       .1781737 
    13/FA |       .1619989 
-------------------------- 
	  
4. Demographics 
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4.1 Ethnicity 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
                                |        Start Term             
                      Ethnicity | 09FA 10FA 11FA 12FA 13FA 
--------------------------------+-------------------------- 
  American Indian/Alaska Native |  2    4    4    2    2 
                          Asian |  127  99   96   134  98 
      Black or African American |  80   67   59   60   43 
                Hispanic/Latino |  110  100  118  98   116 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islande |  8         3         1 
             Non Resident Alien |  74   84   106  106  165 
         Race/Ethnicity Unknown |  196  232  201  161  146 
              Two or more Races |  25   36   44   48   50 
                          White | 1058 1117 1234 1187 1200 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
4.2 Gender 
------------------------ 
Start     |    Gender    
Term      |     F      M 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA |   831    849 
    10/FA |   857    882 
    11/FA |   827  1,038 
    12/FA |   864    932 
    13/FA |   918    903 
------------------------ 
	  
4.3 Percent male 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(male_d~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .5053571 
    10/FA |        .507188 
    11/FA |       .5565684 
    12/FA |        .518931 
    13/FA |       .4958814 
-------------------------- 
	  
4.4 High school type 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |            Start Term             
              HS Type | 09/FA  10/FA  11/FA  12/FA  13/FA 
----------------------+---------------------------------- 
              Charter |     6      7     11     21     18 
          Home School |     3      1      4      3      4 
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Independent Religious |   173    179    231    199    210 
                    N |     1                    1        
              Private |   420    451    460    434    479 
               Public | 1,076  1,101  1,159  1,137  1,110 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
5. Geography 
	  
5.1 International status 
------------------------ 
          |international 
Start     |    status    
Term      |     N      Y 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA | 1,513    167 
    10/FA | 1,553    186 
    11/FA | 1,664    201 
    12/FA | 1,601    195 
    13/FA | 1,551    270 
------------------------ 
	  
5.2 Percent international 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(intern~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .0994048 
    10/FA |        .106958 
    11/FA |       .1077748 
    12/FA |       .1085746 
    13/FA |       .1482702 
-------------------------- 
	  
5.3 Region 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Start     |                                region                                
Term      | Mid-Atlantic            NY    North East      Other US    Outside US 
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |          159           638           536           271            76 
    10/FA |          173           603           601           279            83 
    11/FA |          175           591           679           306           114 
    12/FA |          153           604           667           252           120 
    13/FA |          155           579           659           260           168 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
6. Academic qualifiers 
	  
6.1 Applicant rating 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
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Term      | mean(applic~g)   min(applic~g)   max(applic~g) 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |        67.7876              20              95 
    10/FA |        67.7108              26              90 
    11/FA |         65.331               5              90 
    12/FA |        65.9787              28              90 
    13/FA |        66.0203              10              96 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
6.2 GPA 
---------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      |  mean(gpa)    min(gpa)    max(gpa) 
----------+----------------------------------- 
    09/FA |   92.19617        78.4       116.4 
    10/FA |   91.84925       77.13       111.7 
    11/FA |   90.81499       76.19       104.7 
    12/FA |   90.53594        79.3         100 
    13/FA |   90.42184        67.8       102.4 
---------------------------------------------- 
	  
6.3 High school rating 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(hsrating)   min(hsrating)   max(hsrating) 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |        3.16233               1               5 
    10/FA |        3.19707               1               5 
    11/FA |        3.20952               1               5 
    12/FA |        3.26518               1               5 
    13/FA |        3.23604               1               5 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
6.4 SAT 
---------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      |  mean(sat)    min(sat)    max(sat) 
----------+----------------------------------- 
    09/FA |     1303.1         500        1600 
    10/FA |   1314.847         560        1600 
    11/FA |   1310.757         490        1600 
    12/FA |   1323.105         850        1590 
    13/FA |   1328.969         930        1600 
---------------------------------------------- 
	  
6.5 SAT math 
------------------------------------------------------- 
	   40	  
Start     | 
Term      | mean(satmath)   min(satmath)   max(satmath) 
----------+-------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |        662.02             20            800 
    10/FA |       670.868             10            800 
    11/FA |       668.635             40            800 
    12/FA |       674.793            430            800 
    13/FA |       679.949            440            800 
------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
6.6 SAT verbal 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(satver~l)   min(satver~l)   max(satver~l) 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |         641.08              20             800 
    10/FA |        643.979             350             800 
    11/FA |        642.122             400             800 
    12/FA |        648.311             410             800 
    13/FA |        649.019             400             800 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
6.7 Schedule strength 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(schedu~h)   min(schedu~h)   max(schedu~h) 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |        8.23633               1              10 
    10/FA |        8.67901               1              10 
    11/FA |        8.55833               2              11 
    12/FA |        8.71325               2              11 
    13/FA |        8.64388               1              11 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
6.8 Scholar status 
---------------------------------------- 
Start     |        scholarstatus         
Term      | Not a Scholar        Scholar 
----------+----------------------------- 
    09/FA |         1,162            518 
    10/FA |         1,250            489 
    11/FA |         1,423            442 
    12/FA |         1,350            446 
    13/FA |         1,329            492 
---------------------------------------- 
	  
6.9 Percent scholars 
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-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(schola~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .3083333 
    10/FA |       .2811961 
    11/FA |       .2369973 
    12/FA |       .2483296 
    13/FA |       .2701812 
-------------------------- 
	  
6.10 Special recruit 
------------------------ 
          |specialrecrui 
Start     |   t_dummy    
Term      |     0      1 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA | 1,598     82 
    10/FA | 1,671     68 
    11/FA | 1,743    122 
    12/FA | 1,667    129 
    13/FA | 1,668    153 
------------------------ 
	  
6.11 Percent special recruit 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(specia~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .0488095 
    10/FA |       .0391029 
    11/FA |       .0654155 
    12/FA |       .0718263 
    13/FA |       .0840198 
-------------------------- 
 
6.12 Testing not considered 
------------------------ 
          |testingnotcon 
Start     |sidered_dummy 
Term      |     0      1 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA | 1,304    376 
    10/FA | 1,362    377 
    11/FA | 1,470    395 
    12/FA | 1,416    380 
    13/FA | 1,425    396 
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------------------------ 
	  
6.13 Percent testing not considered 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(testin~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .2238095 
    10/FA |       .2167913 
    11/FA |       .2117963 
    12/FA |       .2115813 
    13/FA |       .2174629 
-------------------------- 
	  
7. Financial aid 
	  
7.1 Financial aid intent 
------------------------ 
          |Financial Aid 
Start     |    Intent    
Term      |     N      Y 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA |   640  1,040 
    10/FA |   737  1,002 
    11/FA |   734  1,131 
    12/FA |   720  1,076 
    13/FA |   759  1,062 
------------------------ 
	  
7.2 Percent financial aid intent 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(financ~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .6190476 
    10/FA |       .5761932 
    11/FA |       .6064343 
    12/FA |       .5991091 
    13/FA |        .583196 
-------------------------- 
	  
7.3 Financial aid brackets 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                               |            Start Term             
                     u_finneed | 09/FA  10/FA  11/FA  12/FA  13/FA 
-------------------------------+---------------------------------- 
        Financial Need: 25-50% |   119    162    244    232    190 
        Financial Need: 50-75% |   161    178    243    240    216 
        Financial Need: >0-25% |   123    120    172    148    135 
          Financial Need: >75% |   286    245    184    200    219 
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    No Financial Need, Applied |   366    315    309    274    323 
No Financial Need, Not Applied |   625    719    713    702    738 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
	  
7.4 Institutional need 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(instneed)   min(instneed)   max(instneed) 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |       13083.56               0           60748 
    10/FA |       12833.45               0           61695 
    11/FA |       13030.31               0           64543 
    12/FA |       14095.14               0           66403 
    13/FA |       13906.74               0           68264 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
7.5 Percentage need 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(need_pct)   min(need_pct)   max(need_pct) 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
    09/FA |       .2593938               0        1.204386 
    10/FA |       .2452455               0        1.178983 
    11/FA |       .2400883               0        1.189229 
    12/FA |       .2504066               0         1.17968 
    13/FA |       .2387505               0        1.171954 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
8. Other 
	  
8.1 Campus visit 
------------------------ 
Start     | Campus Visit 
Term      |     N      Y 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA |   744    936 
    10/FA |   729  1,010 
    11/FA |   822  1,043 
    12/FA |   706  1,090 
    13/FA |   729  1,092 
------------------------ 
	  
8.2 Campus visit percent 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(campus~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .5571429 
	   44	  
    10/FA |       .5807936 
    11/FA |       .5592493 
    12/FA |       .6069042 
    13/FA |       .5996705 
-------------------------- 
	  
8.3 FAFSA position 
--------------------------------------------- 
union_faf | 
sa_positi |            Start Term             
on        | 09/FA  10/FA  11/FA  12/FA  13/FA 
----------+---------------------------------- 
        0 |   730  1,720  1,863  1,796  1,821 
        1 |   116                             
        2 |    86      3                      
        3 |   114      1                      
        4 |   131      2                      
        5 |   123      5                      
        6 |    98      3      1               
        7 |    92      2                      
        8 |    77      2                      
        9 |    60      1      1               
       10 |    53                             
--------------------------------------------- 
	  
8.4 Legacy status 
------------------------ 
Start     |Legacy Status 
Term      |     N      Y 
----------+------------- 
    09/FA | 1,549    131 
    10/FA | 1,594    145 
    11/FA | 1,757    108 
    12/FA | 1,679    117 
    13/FA | 1,718    103 
------------------------ 
	  
8.5 Percent legacy 
-------------------------- 
Start     | 
Term      | mean(legacy~y) 
----------+--------------- 
    09/FA |       .0779762 
    10/FA |       .0833813 
    11/FA |       .0579088 
    12/FA |       .0651448 
    13/FA |       .0565623 
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-------------------------- 
	  
8.6 Major 
-------------------------------------------------- 
               |            Start Term             
         major | 09/FA  10/FA  11/FA  12/FA  13/FA 
---------------+---------------------------------- 
   engineering |   248    308    370    384    408 
    humanities |   262    198    182    186    164 
  liberal arts |   212    198    222    174    215 
       science |   561    587    595    614    627 
social science |   396    446    495    438    407 
-------------------------------------------------- 
	  
9. Descriptive statistics 
variable |      mean       p50       min       max         N 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
admitted_d~y |         1         1         1         1      8901 
enrolled_d~y |  .1663858         0         0         1      8901 
 alien_dummy |  .0601056         0         0         1      8901 
 asian_dummy |  .0622402         0         0         1      8901 
 black_dummy |  .0347152         0         0         1      8901 
charter_du~y |  .0070779         0         0         1      8901 
  home_dummy |  .0016852         0         0         1      8901 
latino_dummy |   .060892         0         0         1      8901 
  male_dummy |  .5172453         1         0         1      8901 
 other_dummy |  .0243793         0         0         1      8901 
private_du~y |  .2521065         0         0         1      8901 
public_dummy |  .6272329         1         0         1      8901 
 relig_dummy |  .1114482         0         0         1      8901 
unknown_du~y |  .1051567         0         0         1      8901 
 white_dummy |  .6511628         1         0         1      8901 
INTERNATIONAL STATUS DUMMY 
region_ma_~y |  .0915627         0         0         1      8901 
region_ne_~y |   .352994         0         0         1      8901 
region_oth~y |  .1536906         0         0         1      8901 
region_out~y |  .0630266         0         0         1      8901 
applicantr~g |  66.53098        68         5        96      8878 
         gpa |   91.1462      91.3      67.8     116.4      8780 
    hsrating |  3.214784         3         1         5      8739 
         sat |  1315.866      1320       490      1600      6190 
     satmath |  671.0661       670        10       800      6190 
   satverbal |     644.8       640        20       800      6190 
schedulest~h |   8.57091         9         1        11      8821 
scholarsta~y |  .2681721         0         0         1      8901 
specialrec~y |  .0622402         0         0         1      8901 
testingnot~y |  .2161555         0         0         1      8901 
financiala~y |  .5966745         1         0         1      8901 
fin~25_dummy |  .0784182         0         0         1      8901 
finn~a_dummy |  .1782946         0         0         1      8901 
finneed_25~y |  .1063925         0         0         1      8901 
finneed_50~y |  .1166161         0         0         1      8901 
finneed_75~y |  .1274014         0         0         1      8901 
    instneed |  13396.06         0         0     68264      8901 
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    need_pct |  .2388696         0         0  1.166884      8901 
campusvisi~y |   .580946         1         0         1      8901 
legacystat~y |  .0678575         0         0         1      8901 
majorengin~y |   .193012         0         0         1      8901 
majorhuman~y |  .1114482         0         0         1      8901 
majorscien~y |  .3352432         0         0         1      8901 
majorsocia~y |   .245141         0         0         1      8901 
     sat_mid |  1290.713      1300       820      1525      3581 
 selectivity |  41.67139   39.3154   5.81307  98.96824      4243 
union_fafs~n |  .5393776         0         0        10      8901 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
	  
10. T-tests 
 
10.1 Black versus all other 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    8592    .1636406    .0039914    .3699707    .1558166    .1714646 
       1 |     309    .2427184    .0244289    .4294217    .1946497    .2907872 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0790779    .0215503               -.1213215   -.0368342 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -3.6694 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0001         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0002          Pr(T > t) = 0.9999 
 
10.2 Gender 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       F |    4297    .1740749     .005785     .379218    .1627333    .1854166 
       M |    4604    .1592094    .0053927     .365911    .1486371    .1697817 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0148656     .007899               -.0006183    .0303494 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(F) - mean(M)                                      t =   1.8820 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9701         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0599          Pr(T > t) = 0.0299 
 
10.3 Public versus all other 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    3318    .1446655    .0061077    .3518162    .1326902    .1566407 
       1 |    5583    .1792943    .0051343    .3836329     .169229    .1893595 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
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---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0346288    .0081564               -.0506172   -.0186404 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -4.2456 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
10.4 International status 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Internat |    1019    .1894014    .0122806    .3920195    .1653031    .2134996 
Not Inte |    7882    .1634103    .0041649    .3697631     .155246    .1715746 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0259911    .0123964                .0016912    .0502909 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(Internat) - mean(Not Inte)                        t =   2.0967 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9820         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0361          Pr(T > t) = 0.0180 
 
10.5 Mean applicant rating across enrollment 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    7408     67.1331    .1353146    11.64649    66.86784    67.39835 
       1 |    1470     63.4966    .3335478    12.78841    62.84232    64.15088 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8878    66.53098     .126501    11.91932      66.283    66.77895 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            3.636501    .3381531                2.973642    4.299359 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  10.7540 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8876 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
10.6 Mean GPA across enrollment 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    7327    91.21957    .0459884    3.936507    91.12942    91.30972 
       1 |    1453    90.77619    .1094111    4.170558    90.56157    90.99081 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8780     91.1462    .0424684     3.97936    91.06295    91.22945 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |             .443382     .114187                .2195487    .6672153 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.8829 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8778 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.9999         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001          Pr(T > t) = 0.0001 
 
10.7 Mean SAT across enrollment 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    4848    1338.061    1.445824    100.6693    1335.227    1340.896 
       1 |     851    1295.159    3.371649    98.35741    1288.541    1301.776 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    5699    1331.655    1.344223    101.4777     1329.02     1334.29 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            42.90263    3.728843                35.59267    50.21258 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  11.5056 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     5697 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
10.8 Scholar status 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    6854    .1803327    .0046443    .3844923    .1712285    .1894368 
       1 |    2047    .1196873    .0071761    .3246749    .1056141    .1337606 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0606453    .0093596                .0422984    .0789922 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   6.4795 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
10.9 Testing consideration 
Two-sample ttest with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    6977     .146338    .0042317      .35347    .1380425    .1546335 
       1 |    1924    .2390852    .0097265    .4266358    .2200097    .2581608 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0927473    .0095407               -.1114492   -.0740454 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -9.7213 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
10.10 Financial aid intent 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
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---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       N |    3590    .1061281    .0051412    .3080445    .0960481    .1162081 
       Y |    5311    .2071173    .0055612    .4052785    .1962151    .2180195 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.1009892    .0079762               -.1166244    -.085354 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(N) - mean(Y)                                      t = -12.6613 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
10.11 Mean percentage institutional need across enrollment 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    7420    .2063467     .003615     .311393    .1992603    .2134331 
       1 |    1481    .4018135    .0103453    .3981253    .3815205    .4221064 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .2388696     .003555    .3353923     .231901    .2458381 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.1954668    .0093183               -.2137329   -.1772008 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t = -20.9766 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
10.12 Campus visit 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       N |    3730    .0782842    .0043989    .2686543    .0696598    .0869086 
       Y |    5171    .2299362    .0058522    .4208323    .2184633     .241409 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -.151652    .0078383               -.1670168   -.1362872 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(N) - mean(Y)                                      t = -19.3477 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
10.13 Legacy status 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       N |    8297    .1530674     .003953    .3600741    .1453184    .1608163 
       Y |     604    .3493377    .0194152     .477156    .3112081    .3874674 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    8901    .1663858    .0039477    .3724475    .1586474    .1741242 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.1962704     .015559               -.2267696   -.1657712 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(N) - mean(Y)                                      t = -12.6146 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     8899 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
11. Probit regressions 
 
11.1 Demographics, high school type, geography 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
    
male_dummy -0.014** -0.012* -0.013* 
 (-2.08) (-1.78) (-1.84) 
black_dummy 0.043** 0.048** 0.050*** 
 (2.32) (2.52) (2.63) 
asian_dummy -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 
 (-1.38) (-1.57) (-1.41) 
latino_dummy -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.38) (-0.32) (-0.29) 
alien_dummy -0.013 -0.002 0.014 
 (-0.98) (-0.16) (0.44) 
unknown_dummy -0.185*** -0.184*** -0.183*** 
 (-7.32) (-7.32) (-7.42) 
other_dummy -0.003 -0.002 0.002 
 (-0.14) (-0.08) (0.08) 
charter_dummy  -0.011  
  (-0.28)  
home_dummy  0.221**  
  (2.15)  
relig_dummy  -0.016  
  (-1.45)  
private_dummy  -0.037***  
  (-4.54)  
region_ma_dummy   -0.055*** 
   (-4.68) 
region_ne_dummy   -0.007 
   (-0.87) 
region_other_dummy   -0.050*** 
   (-5.00) 
region_out_dummy   -0.041 
   (-1.45) 
    
Observations 8,901 8,899 8,901 
r2_p 0.0452 0.0486 0.0508 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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11.2 Demographics, high school type, academics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
     
male_dummy -0.012* -0.017** -0.019*** 0.018* 
 (-1.78) (-2.51) (-2.71) (1.71) 
black_dummy 0.048** 0.018 0.039** -0.063** 
 (2.52) (0.99) (2.11) (-2.45) 
asian_dummy -0.021 -0.013 -0.020 -0.024 
 (-1.57) (-0.97) (-1.51) (-1.24) 
latino_dummy -0.004 -0.013 -0.008 -0.073*** 
 (-0.32) (-0.97) (-0.61) (-3.84) 
alien_dummy -0.002 0.012 -0.006 -0.021 
 (-0.16) (0.82) (-0.39) (-1.11) 
unknown_dummy -0.184*** -0.178*** -0.182***  
 (-7.32) (-7.02) (-7.24)  
other_dummy -0.002 -0.015 -0.005 -0.002 
 (-0.08) (-0.76) (-0.22) (-0.06) 
charter_dummy -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 -0.024 
 (-0.28) (-0.32) (-0.36) (-0.40) 
home_dummy 0.221** 0.257** 0.200* 0.313** 
 (2.15) (2.47) (1.92) (2.40) 
relig_dummy -0.016 -0.029*** -0.022** -0.023 
 (-1.45) (-2.76) (-2.03) (-1.40) 
private_dummy -0.037*** -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.049*** 
 (-4.54) (-7.32) (-6.33) (-4.01) 
applicantrating  -0.003***   
  (-11.74)   
gpa   -0.006***  
   (-6.02)  
sat    -0.001*** 
    (-14.06) 
     
Observations 8,899 8,876 8,778 5,541 
r2_p 0.0486 0.0664 0.0537 0.0445 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.3 Academics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
    
male_dummy -0.020*** -0.019*** 0.013 
 (-2.86) (-2.71) (1.29) 
black_dummy 0.016 0.037** -0.068*** 
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 (0.92) (2.01) (-2.66) 
asian_dummy -0.010 -0.017 -0.022 
 (-0.76) (-1.24) (-1.13) 
latino_dummy -0.013 -0.008 -0.076*** 
 (-0.95) (-0.60) (-3.98) 
alien_dummy -0.008 -0.023 -0.037** 
 (-0.61) (-1.58) (-2.05) 
unknown_dummy -0.181*** -0.183***  
 (-7.07) (-7.28)  
other_dummy -0.016 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-0.77) (-0.24) (-0.13) 
applicantrating -0.003***   
 (-10.16)   
gpa  -0.004***  
  (-4.02)  
sat   -0.001*** 
   (-13.95) 
    
Observations 8,878 8,780 5,542 
r2_p 0.0584 0.0480 0.0400 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.4 Testing not considered 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
    
male_dummy -0.006 -0.012* -0.009 
 (-0.81) (-1.74) (-1.32) 
black_dummy 0.014 -0.001 0.009 
 (0.80) (-0.06) (0.54) 
asian_dummy -0.019 -0.012 -0.017 
 (-1.44) (-0.89) (-1.31) 
latino_dummy -0.018 -0.021 -0.020 
 (-1.34) (-1.60) (-1.52) 
alien_dummy -0.016 -0.012 -0.026* 
 (-1.19) (-0.85) (-1.78) 
unknown_dummy -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.181*** 
 (-7.20) (-7.01) (-7.16) 
other_dummy -0.007 -0.017 -0.009 
 (-0.34) (-0.84) (-0.41) 
testingnotconsidered_dummy 0.079*** 0.060*** 0.078*** 
 (8.85) (6.74) (8.71) 
applicantrating  -0.002***  
  (-8.62)  
gpa   -0.003*** 
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   (-3.52) 
    
Observations 8,901 8,878 8,780 
r2_p 0.0549 0.0640 0.0574 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(Note: testingnotconsidered_dummy is not run with SAT because only 491 students had 
their SAT scores submitted to Union, but not considered during the admissions process.) 
 
11.5 Scholar status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dumm
y 
enrolled_dumm
y 
     
male_dummy -0.020*** -0.018** 0.013 -0.008 
 (-2.86) (-2.57) (1.23) (-1.20) 
black_dummy 0.016 0.030* -0.068*** 0.008 
 (0.91) (1.68) (-2.66) (0.44) 
asian_dummy -0.011 -0.017 -0.022 -0.019 
 (-0.78) (-1.26) (-1.13) (-1.43) 
latino_dummy -0.013 -0.012 -0.076*** -0.021 
 (-0.96) (-0.89) (-3.99) (-1.62) 
alien_dummy -0.009 -0.021 -0.037** -0.014 
 (-0.62) (-1.44) (-2.03) (-1.04) 
unknown_dummy -0.181*** -0.182***  -0.182*** 
 (-7.08) (-7.30)  (-7.21) 
other_dummy -0.016 -0.008 -0.005 -0.011 
 (-0.78) (-0.40) (-0.15) (-0.55) 
scholarstatus_dummy -0.005 -0.047*** -0.006 -0.043*** 
 (-0.51) (-5.15) (-0.45) (-5.34) 
applicantrating -0.003***    
 (-7.84)    
gpa  -0.001   
  (-1.19)   
sat   -0.001***  
   (-12.97)  
testingnotconsidered_dummy    0.072*** 
    (8.01) 
     
Observations 8,878 8,780 5,542 8,901 
r2_p 0.0585 0.0514 0.0401 0.0585 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.6 Financial aid intent 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
     
male_dummy -0.011 -0.017** -0.019*** 0.017* 
 (-1.58) (-2.52) (-2.77) (1.66) 
black_dummy 0.011 -0.027* -0.005 -0.083*** 
 (0.66) (-1.76) (-0.32) (-3.48) 
asian_dummy -0.031** -0.023* -0.030** -0.033* 
 (-2.39) (-1.86) (-2.42) (-1.75) 
latino_dummy -0.024* -0.037*** -0.031** -0.086*** 
 (-1.86) (-3.14) (-2.54) (-4.73) 
alien_dummy 0.005 0.022 -0.003 -0.020 
 (0.32) (1.50) (-0.19) (-1.04) 
unknown_dummy -0.179*** -0.172*** -0.176***  
 (-7.20) (-6.79) (-7.09)  
other_dummy -0.014 -0.030 -0.021 -0.014 
 (-0.69) (-1.60) (-1.06) (-0.45) 
financialaidintent_dummy 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.086*** 
 (11.88) (14.66) (13.64) (8.21) 
applicantrating  -0.004***   
  (-13.62)   
gpa   -0.007***  
   (-7.69)  
sat    -0.001*** 
    (-13.91) 
     
Observations 8,901 8,878 8,780 5,542 
r2_p 0.0634 0.0867 0.0725 0.0535 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.7 Financial aid brackets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
     
male_dummy -0.005 -0.011* -0.015** 0.023** 
 (-0.77) (-1.73) (-2.30) (2.27) 
black_dummy -0.051*** -0.079*** -0.067*** -0.117*** 
 (-3.42) (-6.46) (-5.05) (-5.59) 
asian_dummy -0.060*** -0.055*** -0.062*** -0.065*** 
 (-5.08) (-4.86) (-5.49) (-3.58) 
latino_dummy -0.060*** -0.073*** -0.069*** -0.113*** 
 (-5.11) (-6.96) (-6.31) (-6.64) 
alien_dummy -0.009 0.012 -0.014 -0.030* 
 (-0.63) (0.83) (-0.97) (-1.65) 
unknown_dummy -0.174*** -0.165*** -0.170***  
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 (-7.53) (-7.09) (-7.44)  
other_dummy -0.031 -0.047*** -0.040** -0.030 
 (-1.60) (-2.73) (-2.21) (-1.02) 
finneed_0_a_dummy 0.036*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.024 
 (3.34) (5.58) (5.21) (1.57) 
finneed_0_25_dummy 0.011 0.034** 0.030** 0.000 
 (0.73) (2.28) (2.00) (0.01) 
finneed_25_50_dummy 0.053*** 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.058*** 
 (4.04) (6.53) (5.99) (3.11) 
finneed_50_75_dummy 0.161*** 0.221*** 0.205*** 0.169*** 
 (11.86) (14.94) (14.00) (9.05) 
finneed_75_dummy 0.267*** 0.342*** 0.331*** 0.255*** 
 (17.28) (20.16) (19.35) (12.10) 
applicantrating  -0.004***   
  (-15.60)   
gpa   -0.009***  
   (-10.21)  
sat    -0.001*** 
    (-13.24) 
     
Observations 8,901 8,878 8,780 5,542 
r2_p 0.0925 0.123 0.107 0.0796 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.8 Campus visit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
     
male_dummy -0.006 -0.011* -0.011* 0.021** 
 (-0.94) (-1.68) (-1.66) (2.16) 
black_dummy 0.076*** 0.041** 0.066*** -0.035 
 (3.86) (2.23) (3.44) (-1.29) 
asian_dummy 0.015 0.019 0.014 0.031 
 (1.04) (1.33) (1.02) (1.44) 
latino_dummy 0.020 0.006 0.014 -0.042** 
 (1.38) (0.47) (1.01) (-2.14) 
alien_dummy 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.075** 0.127** 
 (2.81) (3.03) (2.04) (2.38) 
unknown_dummy -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.164***  
 (-7.56) (-7.31) (-7.52)  
other_dummy 0.013 -0.002 0.010 0.019 
 (0.60) (-0.08) (0.46) (0.59) 
region_ma_dummy -0.048*** -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.043** 
 (-4.23) (-5.36) (-4.73) (-2.49) 
region_ne_dummy -0.017** -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.011 
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 (-2.18) (-3.97) (-3.02) (-0.98) 
region_other_dummy -0.027*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.035** 
 (-2.72) (-3.73) (-3.18) (-2.20) 
region_out_dummy -0.010 -0.020 -0.005 -0.020 
 (-0.35) (-0.73) (-0.18) (-0.46) 
campusvisit_dummy 0.144*** 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.186*** 
 (19.12) (18.97) (19.15) (16.40) 
applicantrating  -0.003***   
  (-10.62)   
gpa   -0.004***  
   (-4.47)  
sat    -0.001*** 
    (-14.05) 
     
Observations 8,901 8,878 8,780 5,542 
r2_p 0.101 0.116 0.106 0.104 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.9  Legacy status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
     
male_dummy -0.012* -0.018*** -0.017** 0.015 
 (-1.81) (-2.59) (-2.47) (1.44) 
black_dummy 0.059*** 0.030* 0.051*** -0.056** 
 (3.08) (1.66) (2.74) (-2.15) 
asian_dummy -0.006 0.002 -0.004 -0.009 
 (-0.46) (0.16) (-0.32) (-0.45) 
latino_dummy 0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.067*** 
 (0.30) (-0.27) (0.06) (-3.48) 
alien_dummy -0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.024 
 (-0.05) (0.31) (-0.69) (-1.31) 
unknown_dummy -0.181*** -0.177*** -0.180***  
 (-7.33) (-7.08) (-7.29)  
other_dummy 0.009 -0.004 0.007 0.009 
 (0.44) (-0.20) (0.33) (0.29) 
legacystatus_dummy 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.193*** 
 (11.59) (11.63) (11.52) (8.82) 
applicantrating  -0.003***   
  (-10.23)   
gpa   -0.004***  
   (-4.20)  
sat    -0.001*** 
    (-13.67) 
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Observations 8,901 8,878 8,780 5,542 
r2_p 0.0615 0.0749 0.0643 0.0547 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.10 Majors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy enrolled_dummy 
     
male_dummy -0.011 -0.019*** -0.017** 0.017 
 (-1.59) (-2.64) (-2.28) (1.64) 
black_dummy 0.043** 0.015 0.037** -0.068*** 
 (2.30) (0.88) (1.98) (-2.69) 
asian_dummy -0.018 -0.012 -0.017 -0.026 
 (-1.35) (-0.88) (-1.29) (-1.34) 
latino_dummy -0.005 -0.013 -0.008 -0.076*** 
 (-0.39) (-0.94) (-0.60) (-3.99) 
alien_dummy -0.014 -0.009 -0.024 -0.037** 
 (-1.02) (-0.63) (-1.59) (-2.00) 
unknown_dummy -0.184*** -0.180*** -0.183***  
 (-7.32) (-7.08) (-7.28)  
other_dummy -0.002 -0.015 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.09) (-0.74) (-0.20) (-0.10) 
majorsocialscience_dummy -0.025** -0.022* -0.024** -0.017 
 (-2.17) (-1.90) (-2.05) (-0.94) 
majorhumanities_dummy -0.038*** -0.033** -0.036*** -0.021 
 (-2.87) (-2.50) (-2.70) (-1.01) 
majorscience_dummy -0.029*** -0.013 -0.021* -0.001 
 (-2.61) (-1.17) (-1.88) (-0.04) 
majorengineering_dummy -0.039*** -0.022* -0.032*** -0.032* 
 (-3.28) (-1.81) (-2.63) (-1.79) 
applicantrating  -0.003***   
  (-9.91)   
gpa   -0.003***  
   (-3.79)  
sat    -0.001*** 
    (-13.77) 
     
Observations 8,901 8,878 8,780 5,542 
r2_p 0.0468 0.0594 0.0492 0.0413 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
11.11 Mean SAT scores 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sat_mid sat_mid sat_mid 
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male_dummy 4.660 5.340 -10.390*** 
 (1.37) (1.49) (-2.65) 
black_dummy 49.088*** 33.880*** 78.085*** 
 (4.94) (3.29) (6.32) 
asian_dummy -6.125 -1.821 2.682 
 (-0.75) (-0.21) (0.29) 
latino_dummy 32.941*** 28.754*** 46.017*** 
 (4.51) (3.78) (5.46) 
alien_dummy 13.967 26.766** 35.503*** 
 (1.50) (2.54) (3.53) 
unknown_dummy 0.542 1.556 5.243 
 (0.10) (0.29) (0.87) 
other_dummy 47.416*** 46.160*** 50.384*** 
 (4.22) (3.92) (3.75) 
applicantrating 2.826***   
 (19.20)   
gpa  4.176***  
  (9.15)  
sat   0.398*** 
   (21.80) 
Constant 1,092.619*** 902.161*** 761.146*** 
 (104.72) (21.47) (31.16) 
    
Observations 3,581 3,552 2,549 
R-squared 0.102 0.033 0.168 
r2_p . . . 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
11.12 Selectivity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES selectivity selectivity selectivity 
    
male_dummy 1.378*** 1.460*** -0.915 
 (2.66) (2.70) (-1.48) 
black_dummy 10.939*** 8.851*** 16.399*** 
 (6.97) (5.49) (8.13) 
asian_dummy 3.625*** 4.220*** 4.016*** 
 (2.89) (3.25) (2.74) 
latino_dummy 7.419*** 6.875*** 10.063*** 
 (6.52) (5.87) (7.36) 
alien_dummy -0.998 0.825 1.861 
 (-0.71) (0.52) (1.18) 
unknown_dummy 1.004 1.141 1.513 
 (1.27) (1.40) (1.61) 
other_dummy 7.919*** 7.528*** 7.637*** 
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 (4.60) (4.23) (3.64) 
applicantrating 0.419***   
 (18.72)   
gpa  0.619***  
  (8.95)  
sat   0.057*** 
   (19.68) 
Constant 28.335*** -0.028 -18.243*** 
 (17.98) (-0.00) (-4.71) 
    
Observations 4,243 4,209 2,948 
R-squared 0.092 0.035 0.136 
r2_p . . . 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
12. Existing literature 
 
 The area of enrollment management is thought to have first begun at Boston 
College in the early to mid-1970s. Since then, a wide array of literature has been written 
on the subject ranging from traditional academic pieces to industry white papers and case 
studies.  
 Alan Seidman wrote a fine academic publication for the Center for the Study of 
College Student Retention looking specifically at enrollment models for Parkland College 
in Illinois. Cullen Goenner and Kenton Pauls also deal with the issue of predicting 
enrollment in their paper, “A Predictive Model of Inquiry to Enrollment,” for Research in 
Higher Eductation. Christopher Avery and Jonathan Levin contributed a paper to the 
American Economic Review regarding early admissions at selective colleges. Caroline 
Hoxby is another notable academic who writes on the topic of selectivity and student 
choices when it comes to higher education. Her work can be found in academic journals 
such as the Journal of Economic Perspectives.  
 In terms of industry white papers, companies like Noel-Levitz and Maguire 
Associates have produced a number of pieces surrounding the latest findings in 
enrollment management in an effort not only to expand the field, but also to attract more 
business to their firms. The companies also share articles by the likes of John Maguire, 
who wrote about the phenomenon of offering early decision to prospective students at the 
college level in “A Level Playing Field; Is dropping early decision a good idea?” 
Additionally, a number of these companies send their senior consultants to speak about 
enrollment management at nation-wide conferences, such as the National Association for 
College Admission Counseling conference.  
 Finally, there are a number of blogs and forums concerning the area of enrollment 
management. Tim Copeland writes a notable blog titled “Higher Education Marketing 
and Enrollment Management,” which includes everything from the most recent 
management analysis to detailed case studies. Similarly, the site University Business has 
a wide array of information regarding solutions for higher education management. Also, 
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the aforementioned Noel-Levitz has a blog where it shares the latest in higher education 
consulting findings.  
 
A. Determinants of student choices 
 Since about the 1960s, the market for higher education has changed so that 
students and their families began viewing a college education as a type of commodity. 
Students began preferring colleges not for their proximity to that student’s home, but for 
their resources and student body (Hoxby 2009). At the same time, the number of 
suppliers, or colleges, on the market began increasing substantially. Suddenly admissions 
officials found themselves in salesmen-like roles, needing to persuade students not only 
to apply to their colleges, but also to choose to enroll once accepted. Effectively 
managing these enrollment or yield numbers was and is absolutely crucial to college 
admissions officials as yield has significant implications for the college; the more 
prospects that can be turned into applicants and subsequently enrollees, the more even the 
revenue stream an institution can expect (Seidman 1995).  
 Over the past 50 years there has been a decrease in students’ costs of obtaining 
information about colleges (Hoxby 2009). In the 1960s, college guides began including 
“hard” information on student’s test scores and grades. In the 1970s, college guides 
sought universal coverage. In the 1980s, guides began to gather information in a uniform 
way. Finally, in the age of the internet, the volume of information available on any given 
institution exploded, making it even easier for students to find and compare the colleges 
that match their criteria. 
 Goenner and Pauls 2006 focuses on determinants of student choices. The pair 
looked at a sample consisting of 15,827 students that inquired to a medium-sized, public, 
Doctoral I university and were interested in attending in the fall of 2003. Of these 
students, 2067 decided to enroll. The study found that those applicants who expressed 
interest in a particular major were more likely to enroll. “The number of inquiry contacts, 
campus visits, and whether the inquiry was referred all had positive effects on enrollment 
probability.” Additionally, Goenner and Pauls’s analysis found that “The interaction 
variable between campus visit and distance traveled was highly significant.” 
At the 2009 National Association for College Admission Counseling a panel led 
by Mark Kantrowitz, John Maguire, James Murtha, and Tara Scholder presented a survey 
of 22,734 high school seniors, 8,132 high school juniors, and 5,705 parents. The survey 
showed that of the students who initially preferred a public college (64% of respondents), 
84% ending up actually enrolling at a public institution while 14% “switched” to a 
private college. Among the students who preferred a private college initially (24%), 73% 
enrolled at a private institution while 27% “switched.” The numbers show that  “Students 
whose initial preference was to attend a private college were twice as likely to switch 
than those who preferred a public institution.” This group was reported to be “more 
ethnically diverse with a higher proportion of Asian and Hispanic students, much more 
likely to cite ‘total cost’ and ‘close to home’ among their top reasons for choosing their 
enrollment school, and less likely to have chosen their enrollment school for its 
‘academic reputation,’ ‘campus setting,’ or ‘religious affiliation.’” The group who 
switched from public to private had a “higher proportion of African-American and first 
generation college students, lower household income/SES, slightly lower GPA, and was 
more likely to have chosen a school for the ‘scholarship/financial assistance’ it offered.” 
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 This study has interesting implications for Union College, especially as a private 
institution. One hypothesis that could be made is if private colleges, which are twice as 
likely as public universities to lose students whose initial preferences were for a private 
institution, could target Asian and Hispanic students, or those students who report “total 
cost” and “close to home” as imperative criteria when choosing an enrollment school, 
then those institutions might be able to achieve better yield rates. 
 
B. Proposals to increase yield 
 
 i. Administrative suggestions 
 On the administrative and organizational side of enrollment management, many 
studies have shown ineffectiveness being born from administrative “silos.” Effective 
enrollment management must span multiple offices, programs, and disciplines throughout 
the college. In an interview conducted by Kathy Kurz and Jim Scannell, Wayne Locust of 
the University at Albany suggests reaching beyond traditional enrollment offices, such as 
Admissions, Financial Aid, and the Registrar, and involving orientation committees, 
Public Relations, Alumni Relations, Institutional Research, and Student Affairs, among 
others, in the process in order to get accepted students to enroll. 
 Barbara Fritze of Gettysburg College recommends integrating the offices of 
Admissions, Financial Aid, Institutional Analysis, Intercollegiate Athletics, and 
Communications and Public Relations into one vice president’s portfolio in order to 
better meet enrollment goals (Kurz and Scannell 2006). 
 Many articles have identified effective communication tools and programs to 
entice accepted student to enroll. Tim Copeland of the blog, “Higher Education 
Marketing and Enrollment Management,” points out that consumers are super-sensitive 
to mass marketing and will be turned off from a school that “spams” them. Students don’t 
want more marketing, rather they desire better conversation. Schools should “design 
multi-channel conversations using offers, information, and stories that communicate with 
students based on their needs, wants, and interests. An interactive approach to enrollment 
marketing is about addressing the student, remembering what she says, and then 
communicating again in a way that demonstrates you remember what they told you.” 
 Similarly, in a spring 2013 poll conducted by Noel-Levitz, college admissions 
officials at four-year private institutions rated campus open house events as the most 
effective practice for marketing and student recruitment, followed by campus visit days 
for high school students, encouraging prospective students to apply on the admissions 
website, encouraging prospective students to schedule campus visits on the admission 
website, and using enrolled students in recruitment/marketing. The poll also found that 
sending an email message was the preferred method for making first contact with 
purchased names. Of course, as Copeland highlights, this method of communication 
should be used sparingly.  
 Noel-Levitz 2012 reports that the median 2012 yield rates from admission to 
enrollment for four-year private institutions were 34% for online applicants, 39% for 
paper applicants, 18% for common applicants, and 19% for outside applicants, which are 
defined as “any applications received from first-year students via an outside agency 
(other than Common Application) such as the Royall FastTrack application.” These are 
important numbers to keep in mind as Union looks at its admissions metrics. Additionally 
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the benchmark report shares that the median 2012 yield rate from admission to 
enrollment for four-year private institutions was 29%, with 31% for in-state applicants, 
23% for out-of-state applicants, and 23% for international applicants. The median capture 
rate from deposited to enrollment was 91%. 
 Finally, one innovative program that the University of Pittsburgh is using in 
increase its enrollment numbers is its Internship Preparation Program through which the 
school essentially guarantees every undergraduate the opportunity of an internship. 
Cheryl Finlay, the director of the University’s Office of Career Development and 
Placement Assistance, says the “the effort to help students gain experience-based learning 
helps the University reach its goal of 95% employment placement for new graduates. The 
closer the office is to attaining that goal, the better Pitt is able to recruit and retain top 
students and to maintain an engaged alumni population.” 
 
 ii. Application fees 
 Many interesting reports are available regarding using fees in the application 
process and what kind of application certain institutions should consider using. Apart 
from suggesting that schools only focus on securing those items that truly provide 
information on a student’s admissibility during the admissions process, Coen 2012 
reports that those campuses charging a fee of less than $35 had higher yield rates than 
those not charging a fee. Additionally, the benchmark data showed that institutions with 
the highest yield rates are charging a deposit fee, but keeping that fee less than $200.  
 Finally, the data from the benchmark study indicates that “paper applications will 
yield higher than online applications, and that campus applications will yield higher than 
applications provided by outside agencies.” 
 
 iii. Early decision versus regular decision 
 While our study will only focus on the enrollment decisions of regular decision 
applicants, many publications have discussed the implications that an early decision 
admissions process might have on an institution’s enrollment rates. Avery and Levin 
2010 argue that, “colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, 
and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.” 
They also found that “students who are admitted early are more likely to enroll than 
students who are admitted through regular admissions.” Finally, “a lower ranked school, 
by adopting an early decision policy, can attract some highly ranked but cautious students 
from a more highly ranked school.” 
 Maguire 2007 says that, “so-called second-tier, high-quality schools often use 
early decision to lock in commitments from desirable candidates who might otherwise 
defect to the very top schools if they could delay deciding until spring.” These schools 
use strategies such as offering Presidential Merit Scholarships and honor programs in 
order to “reduce the value differential” for top students who find it too risky to apply to 
the very top schools, but find it even riskier to not apply to anywhere until the spring. 
Early decision programs will also have implications for college rankings in the U.S. News 
& World Report as increased early decision enrollment rates could lead to overall 
decreasing acceptance rate, improving institutional rankings. 
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